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Abstract 
Using harmonized data from 20 European countries, we examine the causal effect of being 
socially active on old age cognition. To address the endogeneity of social participation, we 
employ nonparametric partial identification methods that bound the average treatment effect for 
the population under fairly plausible, and thus credible, assumptions. We find strong evidence 
that social activities have a positive impact on all cognitive dimensions we analyze. At their 
upper bound these effects are quite large, while at their lower bound they are more modest but 
still salient. Additionally, we show that ignoring the endogeneity of social activities severely 
underestimates the uncertainty about their causal effect on cognition. 
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The strong positive association between cognitive abilities and social engagement has 
been widely documented in recent decades (see Bassuk et al. 1999, Fratiglioni et al. 2004, Ertel 
et al. 2008 and references within). What remains unclear is the causal interpretation of this 
association (i.e., whether an active social life does in fact preserve cognitive skills). This is due 
to the likely endogeneity of social activity, specifically to its correlation with unobservables 
that also affect cognition and that may be both time-invariant (e.g., personality traits like 
intellectual curiosity or zest for life) and time-varying (e.g., health, financial, and family 
problems). 
We address this problem by using for the first time in the related literature nonparametric 
partial identification (PI henceforth) methods that bound the estimate of the causal effect of 
interest. These methods allow for arbitrary correlations of social activities with unobservables 
that can also impact cognition, while making much more plausible assumptions than those used 
in ordinary least square (OLS), panel data and instrumental variables (IV) estimation. As a 
result, our estimates are considerably more likely to pin down the causal effect of interest than 
those found in related literature up to now. 
Assessing the cognitive effect of social activities is especially important in older age, as 
the extent to which people maintain their cognitive ability has a major impact on how well they 
age. For instance, better cognition is associated with better physical health (Der et al., 2009) 
and can influence one’s behaviour in directions beneficial to health (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 
2010). In addition, it is a good predictor of mental health (especially dementia – Fratiglioni et 
al. 2004, Verghese et al. 2003) and lifetime length (Deary et al. 2009).  On the economic side, 
higher cognition leads to higher productivity at work, thus helping older workers remain active 
for longer and build up their retirement savings (Engelhardt et al. 2010). There is also a strong 
positive association of cognitive abilities with financial literacy (Delavande et al. 2008), wealth 
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and risky portfolio holdings (Smith et al. 2010), occupational rank, job performance and income 
(Murnane et al. 1995; Judge et al. 2010), and consumption smoothing and life-satisfaction in 
retirement (Banks et al., 2010). 
Previous studies have proposed five main channels through which social involvement 
may help preserve cognitive functions. First, a ‘weak’ social network can cause loneliness 
(Andersson, 1992), a predictor of mental problems (Prince et al. 1997). Second, by providing 
meaningful social roles and a sense of purpose in old age (Berkman, 2000), social activities 
might have direct neurohormonal effects, including stress reduction (Fratiglioni et al. 2004). 
Third, social involvement is likely to inhibit cognitive decline by challenging ones’ 
communication skills and encourages complex interpersonal exchanges (Berkman, 2000). 
Fourth, staying socially engaged might also require a certain degree of physical activity (beyond 
regular exercise and walking) that could enhance physical health (Colcombe and Kramer, 2003; 
Fratiglioni et al. 2004). Finally, an active social life may induce greater self-esteem and better 
self-care practices, e.g., regular exercise, smoking abstention (Hurst, 1997). 
Despite the potential gains to be had from a socially active life, so far only a few studies 
have attempted to investigate the nature of the relation between social involvement and old age 
cognition. Hu et al. (2012) use cross-sectional data from the China Health and Retirement 
Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) to show a positive association between social activities and 
cognition (especially for short-term memory). The authors try to address the endogeneity of 
social activities via IV methods, but their instruments are not related strongly enough to their 
social involvement measures. Furthermore, Engelhardt et al. (2010) use wave 1 of the Survey 
of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) and a stochastic frontier approach 
(implemented via OLS) to document the same positive relation across 11 European countries. 
Both these observational studies, however, are likely affected by the existence of unobservables 
that can impact both social activities and cognition. 
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Dodge et al. (2015) conduct a randomized control trial on 83 residents of retirement 
centers in Portland, Oregon (selected after eliminating from 383 candidates those with various 
physical and mental ailments) in which the intervention consisted of having conversations with 
trained interviewers 5 days a week for 6 weeks. The authors find a larger improvement 
compared to the control group in fluency test scores for those with no dementia at baseline, but 
no difference in the scores in the computer assessment of mild cognitive impairment, memory 
or word tests. Similarly, Hikichi et al. (2015) assessed the effect of government intervention 
program in Taketoyo, Japan that created 'community salons' to foster social interactions among 
local older residents. With a sample of 2,421 individuals, they use propensity score methods 
(that rely on the assumption of balanced unobservables among control and treated groups) and 
exogenous IV methods to find that salon participants had a lower chance of functional disability. 
 On the other hand, our study does not rely on an assumption of balanced unobservables 
(which is also needed for randomized control trials, see Deaton and Cartwright, 2018), or on 
the existence of exogenous IVs. Moreover, we use large samples, constructed to be 
representative of the 50+ population in 20 countries, hence raising fewer external validity 
concerns.  
We thus believe we can provide the first robust causal estimates of social activities for 
20 European countries across several cognitive dimensions (numeracy, fluency, immediate and 
delayed recall capacity). Specifically, we find that being socially active in older age has an 
important positive impact on cognition. As expected, the lower bound estimates are smaller 
than those derived by assuming that social participation is exogenous to cognition, while the 
upper bounds are quite sizeable. For instance, increasing social participation from zero to two 
or more activities leads on average to an increase in cognitive scores from about 0.03 to about 





2. Data  
We use data from SHARE waves 1-2 and 4-6 that were conducted in a total of 20 
European countries in 2004-5, 2006-7, 2010-11, 2013 and 2015, respectively (SHARE wave 3 
– called SHARELIFE - is a retrospective lifetime survey with a completely different 
questionnaire compared to standard waves). Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy, and Spain participated in all five waves, while 
Greece was present in the first two and in the sixth one. Ireland was present only in the second 
wave. Czech Republic and Poland joined from wave 2 onwards, although Poland skipped wave 
5. Hungary, Portugal, Slovenia, and Estonia joined SHARE in wave 4, with Estonia and 
Slovenia continuing into wave 5, when Luxembourg also entered. Finally, Croatia entered the 
survey in wave 6, in which Portugal also participated.  
SHARE surveys those aged 50 and above and their partners and collects data on 
demographics, physical and mental health (including biomarkers like grip strength and lung 
capacity), cognition, social activities, housing, employment, income, housing, assets, and 
expectations (Börsch-Supan et al. 2005). Its questionnaire is modeled after the U.S. Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) and importantly, it is harmonized, and thus comparable across all 
participant countries, as well as over time. SHARE is a longitudinal data set, but there is also a 
refresher sample in most countries in most waves in order to make up the loss of observations 
via respondents’ death or attrition. Some countries appear only once in SHARE, and obviously 
for these countries we have a single cross-section. 
The SHARE questionnaire provides detailed information on the social activities in 
which respondents engage. Specifically, to construct our measure of social participation we use 
questions asked in all five waves on whether respondents i) engage in voluntary or charity work; 
ii) follow an educational or training course; iii) attend a sport, social or other kind of club; and 
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iv) are involved in a political or community-related organization.  We then define a variable 
that takes three possible values denoting engagement in zero, one, and two or more activities 
from the aforementioned four.   
It is important to note a change in the SHARE questionnaire after wave 2 that regards 
the reference period in which social activities are performed. While in waves 1-2 respondents 
are asked about activities performed in the month prior to the interview, in waves 4-6 the 
relevant time frame is the previous year. It is not clear, however, whether respondents in waves 
4-6, who are asked about activities performed as far back as one year, manage (or even try) to 
remember what happened during the whole year (as opposed to thinking about activities 
performed closer to the interview date). To check whether our results are sensitive to the change 
in the social activities timeline put in place in waves 4-6, we perform a robustness check in 
which only observations from waves 1-2 are used. Our results remain essentially unchanged.  
To obtain information on respondents’ cognitive abilities we use questions that are 
meant to test their recall capacities, as well as their fluency and numeracy skills. Recall capacity 
was captured via a modified Rey’s Auditory Verbal Learning Test (Schmidt, 1996), one of the 
oldest (and extensively validated) mental tests of memory in continuous use albeit in modified 
form (see Strauss et al., 2006 and references within). Specifically, respondents were read a 10-
word list. During the immediate memory test, they were asked to recall aloud as many of these 
words as possible, just after the interviewer finished reading them. To assess delayed memory, 
they were asked to recall the same words after five other questions. The two recall scores equal 
to the number of words correctly recalled. For fluency, we use a Retrieval Fluency variable 
generated via the Woodcock Johnson III (WJ III) Test of Cognitive Abilities (Woodcock et al., 
2001) that shows the number of animals respondents named in one minute, excluding repetitions 
and proper nouns. Finally, numeracy is based on the WJ III Test of Achievement (Woodcock 
et al., 2001) and captured via four maths questions: i) how many people out of 1,000 would be 
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expected to get sick if the chance of getting a disease is 10 percent; ii) what is the sale cost of a 
sofa, given an initial price of €300 and a 50 percent discount; iii) what is the initial price of a 
car if two-thirds of what it costs new is €6,000; iv) what is the final balance of a savings account 
that initially holds €2,000, at 10 percent interest after 2 years. If respondents answer i) correctly 
they are then asked iii) and if they are correct again, they are asked iv). If, however, answer i) 
is incorrect they are directed to ii). Given this sequence, the numeracy score – considered a 
standard indicator of crystallized intelligence (Salthouse, 1985) - is the number of correctly 
answered questions plus one. Note that WJ III is the 3rd revision of the first conormed 
IQ/achievement test ever published (i.e., the 1977 Woodcock-Johnson Psycho-Educational 
Battery; Mather et al., 2001). This is a multifaceted and technically sophisticated test (McGrew 
& Woodcock, 2001) with high validity and generalizability of scores (Schrank et al., 2002). 
SHARE performs multiple imputation of the missing values of several variables, but not 
of those that make up our measure of social activities. We thus need to discard 6,773 
observations (about 2.8 percent of the sample) with such missing information. Moreover, the 
rates of missing values for the four measures of cognition range from about 3.5 to 4 percent of 
the sample. These missing values are, however, multiply imputed in SHARE.  As discussed in 
Section 5, our results are not affected by whether we include in our estimation sample the 
imputed values of the cognitive test variables. 
After combining waves 1-2 and 4-6 of the SHARE data we ended up with a sample of 
237,644 observations with non-missing information for social activities across the five waves. 
Additionally, the numeracy questions were not asked to respondents in the panel subsamples in 
wave 4-6; consequently, there are 107,026 fewer observations for this cognitive score. Table 1 
provides information by country on both social activities and our measures of cognition. We 
note that Switzerland exhibits the highest average numeracy score (2.8 questions answered 
correctly out of 4), and Spain the lowest (1.6 correct answers). Spain represents the lowest 
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extreme also for immediate and delayed recall, with respondents managing to remember on 
average only 4.20 and 2.82 words out of 10, respectively. The opposite is true of Switzerland, 
where respondents remembered 5.67 words immediately and 4.48 words after some time. As 
for fluency, Greece had the lowest average score (13.74 words), while Sweden the highest 
(23.09 words).  
With respect to social activities, we note that only 34 percent of respondents are socially 
active. The countries with the highest prevalence of social participation are Denmark and the 
Netherlands (63 percent and 58 percent respectively), while the lowest prevalence is found in 
Poland (11 percent). Appendix Fig. A.1 plots the mean of each test score by the level of social 
participation. In line with previous empirical findings, we note a strong positive relation 
between social activities and all four cognitive test scores. Interestingly, this association appears 
to be nonlinear, with the rise in mean cognitive scores when going from 0 to 1 activity being 
larger than when going from 1 to 2+ activities. In the remainder of the paper, we investigate the 
extent to which this strong association can be interpreted as a causal effect. 
 
3.  Empirical Methodology 
When estimating the causal effect of social activities on cognition one must account for 
the likely endogeneity of social activities. Such endogeneity may be due to several factors. First, 
time-invariant unobservable factors likely affect both the propensity to be socially active and 
cognitive abilities. For instance, a privileged family background, specific character traits (e.g. 
inquisitiveness, zest for life) or intellectual abilities can make it easier to be socially active and 
are positively associated with cognition. Second, time-varying unobservable factors can also 
act as confounders, with a family crisis, an adverse professional development or financial 
constraints potentially reducing social activities and causing psychological distress, which in 
turn can negatively impact cognition.  
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These unobservable factors imply that socially active people are likely systematically 
different from those less so, even after controlling for observable characteristics. Hence, 
traditional OLS or panel data methods that disregard the effect of such unobservables might 
produce inconsistent estimates of the causal impact of social activity on cognition. A possible 
solution would be to use IV estimation but finding variables that are exogenous to the outcome 
(cognition) while being associated with the treatment (social activity) is not easy. Moreover, as 
the cognitive effect of social activities is very likely heterogeneous across the population, IV 
estimation is problematic because it identifies only the local average treatment effect (LATE 
henceforth), that is, the effect of social activity on cognition for those who become socially 
active due to a change in the instrument value (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). These respondents 
cannot be identified in the data, and in any case, we would prefer to estimate, if possible, the 
causal impact of social activity on cognition across the whole population. 
To address these issues, we use PI methods that can accommodate all possible sources 
of endogeneity and partially identify the causal effect of interest for the whole population. PI 
methods, introduced by Manski (1989, 1990), are nonparametric and produce bounds on the 
average treatment effect (ATE henceforth), meaning they locate it in an identification region 
instead of producing a point estimate. Importantly, they use much more plausible assumptions 
than OLS, panel or IV estimation methods. Below we give a brief overview of the use of PI 
methods in our case, with more details in the Appendix. 
As in Manski (1997), let every individual 𝑖 have a response function 𝑦 • : 𝐷 → 𝑌 that 
maps mutually exclusive and exhaustive treatments 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 into outcomes 𝑦 𝑑 ∈ 𝑌.    
Importantly, the response functions 𝑦 •  can differ across individuals in arbitrary ways, thus 
allowing for unlimited response heterogeneity. Let 𝑤  denote the realized treatment received by 
𝑖, and 𝑦 ≡ 𝑦 𝑤  the associated observed outcome. In our case, the outcomes are the cognitive 
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test scores, while the treatment variable (social participation) takes three possible values 
denoting engaging in zero, one, and two or more activities (as discussed in Section 2).  
Let 𝑦 𝑑  and 𝑦 𝑑  be two possible values of the outcome for individual 𝑖 as a 
function of two different levels of activities 𝑑  and 𝑑 , with 𝑑 𝑑 . We would like to estimate 
the ATE of an increased social engagement on the cognitive test score, i.e.,  
 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  (1)
Note that the ATE in (1) represents the difference in the two mean outcomes, which are both 
evaluated using all population units while taking the distribution of all other observable and 
unobservable variables as given (Manski 1997, p. 1322). This situation can be thought of as a 
non-randomized experiment in which all participants take two different treatment values. 
Clearly, this is a counterfactual setup, as respondents are actually observed taking only one 
treatment value at any given point in time. But it does have some desirable features. First, as 
the whole population is assumed to take two different treatment values, the control and treated 
groups coincide with the population. Thus, the problem of systematic differences between the 
control and treated groups not due to different treatment values is ruled out by construction, as 
the distribution of all variables other than the outcome and the treatment is taken as given, and 
thus all relevant factors other than the treatment are controlled for. Second, since this 
counterfactual non-randomized experiment takes place in a large sample that is representative 
of the population, the external validity of the results is less of a concern. 
  A counterfactual experiment, however, necessarily generates counterfactual outcomes. 
Hence, by the law of iterated expectations, and denoting 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑  by 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 , the 
expected potential outcome 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑   is given by 
 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑  (2)
where 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑  denotes the probability that 𝑤 𝑑. Note that the term 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑  on the 
right-hand side of (2) is an unobserved counterfactual one. The remaining three terms on the 
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right-hand side of (2), however, have sample analogues that are observed in the data. Given that 
𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑  is unobserved, the unconditional expectation 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  is also unobserved. 
Hence the ATE in (1) is equal to the difference between two unobserved average outcomes, and 
thus cannot be calculated without further assumptions. 
If one assumes that the counterfactual conditional expectation 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑  is equal 
to the observed one when the treatment received is equal to 𝑑, i.e., if    
 
 
𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑  (3)
then from (2) it follows that  
 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑  (4)
Equation (4) states that the unobserved potential outcome under 𝑑 is equal to the mean outcome 
when the treatment in fact received is 𝑑. As the sample analogue of the latter is observed in the 
data, one can estimate the unobserved potential outcome 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 , and then the ATE in (1) as 
 
 
𝐴𝑇𝐸 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑  (5)
We refer to the ATE estimate in (5) as the one under exogenous treatment selection (ETS 
henceforth) because it is derived under the assumption that (3) holds, which in turn implies that 
respondents receiving different treatments are not systematically different from one another. In 
other words, (3) implies that selection into treatment is exogenous. 
Equation (3) is likely to be true in the case of a randomized control trial, in which 
treatment assignment is indeed exogenous. In observational data, however, (3) is unlikely to 
hold because treatment assignment is not random, especially when the treatment variable 
reflects a respondent’s decision. In our context, respondents decide whether to be socially active 
or not, and, as already mentioned, those socially active are likely to be systematically different 
from those that are not. Hence, the expected value of the outcome is likely to differ among 
population groups defined by different social activity levels, and this holds for any value 𝑑 of 
the treatment. In other words, the fact that equation (3) is unlikely to hold in our data is due to 
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the endogeneity of the decision to be socially active. Such endogeneity can have any source 
(e.g. time-invariant and time-varying unobservables, or selectivity), and all such sources 
eventually lead to non-random treatment assignment, that is, to the violation of (3). 
The starting point of PI is precisely this violation of (3), and thus estimation proceeds 
under the assumption that the treatment is endogenous. The aim of PI is to manage the 
endogeneity problem by making credible assumptions that can mitigate its consequences and 
lead to informative estimates of the effect of interest. 
Once one rules out the application of (3), the problem of estimating the unobservable 
potential outcome 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  arises. As a solution, Manski (1989) suggested bounding this 
outcome from above and below by bounding the counterfactual potential outcome 
𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑  in (2). Let 𝐿𝐵 𝑑  and 𝑈𝐵 𝑑  denote the lower and upper bounds on 
𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 , computed using a set of assumptions M. Given 𝐿𝐵 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 𝑈𝐵 𝑑 , 
Manski (1990) points out that (1) implies that one can bound the ATE using M as follows: 
 
 
𝐿𝐵 𝑑 𝑈𝐵 𝑑 𝐴𝑇𝐸 𝑈𝐵 𝑑 𝐿𝐵 𝑑  (6)
The interval between the lower and the upper bound on the ATE is its identification 
region. Since it is an interval, the ATE is partially identified. 
When calculating the upper and lower bounds on 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 , a natural starting point is to 
assume that, for any value 𝑑 of the treatment, the outcome space 𝑌 is bounded below and above 
by finite values 𝑌  and 𝑌 , respectively. These values can be used to bound 
𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑 . The assumption of the existence of these finite values is an appropriate one in 
our case, as all our cognition measures have a minimum of zero, while i) the numeracy score 
has a maximum equal to four; ii) the two memory scores have maxima equal to 10; and iii) the 
fluency score is derived based on a one-minute time limit for respondents to provide as many 
words as possible, which implies a finite maximum score that we set to 100 words - the 
maximum score observed across all countries in our data. 
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Given that 𝑌  and 𝑌  are obvious bounds on 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑 , we consider the 
resulting identification regions of 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  and the ATE as ones derived under no assumptions 
(NA henceforth). The NA identification regions are typically very wide, thus uninformative, as 
one would expect when using uninformative assumptions. Hence, we make some additional 
assumptions to narrow the ATE identification range (see below) and provide more details in the 
Appendix.  
The first assumption we make is that of monotone treatment response (MTR henceforth; 
see Manski, 1997), which states that a higher level of social participation weakly increases 
cognition on average (i.e., not necessarily increases it for every individual in the sample; see 
the Appendix for more details). This is a reasonable assumption, as engaging in more social 
activities is highly unlikely to have a widespread negative effect on cognition. There are, 
however, as already discussed, quite a few reasons why one would expect being socially active 
to be beneficial to cognition. In any case, social activities should at worst have no effect on 
cognition on average, which is fully allowed by the MTR assumption. This implies that the 
MTR identification regions always include zero (as shown by Manski, 1997), and thus by using 
MTR on its own one cannot reject of the null of no effect of the treatment on the outcome. 
The use of the MTR assumption can also be justified by the results of several meta-
analyses (see, e.g. Kuiper et al., 2016; Yates et al., 2016; Kelly et al., 2017; Evans et al., 2019) 
that uniformly show that the overwhelming majority of related studies find either a positive or 
a non-existent association between social activities and cognitive and other health outcomes. 
Both results are allowed by the MTR assumption. 
Our second assumption is that of monotone treatment selection (MTS henceforth; see 
Manski and Pepper, 2000), which states in our context that those who are more socially active 
have weakly higher cognitive capacities than those who are less socially active, and this will be 
true for any common level (possibly counterfactual) of social participation. This assumption 
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could be justified, for example, if being socially active is due to personality traits such as higher 
intelligence, intellectual curiosity or zest for life. These characteristics could be associated with 
(weakly) higher cognition, which would manifest itself under any circumstances, as defined by 
the level of social participation.  
Importantly, Manski and Pepper (2000) show that the combination of MTR and MTS 
assumptions can be tested, as it implies that the average level of cognition in the sample is 
weakly positively correlated with the level of social activity (see the Appendix for more details). 
This clearly holds in our sample, as is apparent from Appendix Fig. A.1. Hence, we cannot 
reject the combined MTR and MTS assumptions. 
The third assumption we use is the monotone instrumental variable (MIV henceforth; 
see Manski and Pepper, 2000) one, which states that, for any given number of social activities, 
respondents with higher MIV values have weakly higher cognitive scores on average. Thus, a 
MIV can be associated with the outcome, but in a weakly monotonic manner. This assumption 
can be used to narrow the ATE identification region (see Appendix for details). We choose as 
MIV a variable denoting respondents’ body mass index (BMI), with values divided in 15-tiles 
(as MIVs need to be discretized) and excluding about 2.6 percent of our sample due to 
BMI<=18.5 as such low values are considered indicative of health issues. In our case, the MIV 
assumption implies that BMI is negatively associated with the cognitive score, or not associated 
at all with it. As is the case with exogenous instruments (XIVs), this weak monotonicity 
assumption is imposed on the unobserved mean potential outcome 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 ; it cannot be thus 
tested using the observed data.  
In particular, the MIV assumption for BMI implies that if one examines any two 
subsamples whose members counterfactually have the same level of social engagement but two 
different BMI levels (constant in each subsample), the mean cognitive score in the lower BMI 
subsample will be weakly higher than that in the higher BMI one. First, note that this assumption 
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refers to the mean outcome, thus it does not require that the weak inequality hold for every 
individual in the two subsamples. Second, this inequality is assumed to hold for all treatment 
values (i.e., all levels of social engagement). Finally, as it holds weakly, it also allows for no 
cognitive effect of social activities.  
Clearly this assumption is unverifiable, as in practice respondents with different BMIs 
do not all engage in the same number of social activities. However, given the strong evidence 
of a negative association of BMI with cognition (see below), this assumption seems reasonable. 
Crucially, it is much milder than the (also unverifiable) one of random treatment assignment 
that is necessary to make social activities exogenous. 
Our choice of MIV is based on an extensive literature documenting their negative 
association with old age cognition. For instance, numerous studies have shown poor cognitive 
outcomes to occur more likely in overweight and obese individuals (BMI ≥ 25 and BMI ≥ 30, 
respectively) who systematically fall in the lowest quartile of global cognition, immediate and 
delayed recall, fluency and intelligence (Benito-León et al., 2013). Moreover, BMI has been 
related to a range of chronic problems (Bray, 2004) that have been associated with worsened 
cognition, such as: i) cardiovascular diseases (e.g., hypertension, myocardial infarction - 
Waldstein and Elias, 2001), which also predispose to stroke (Kannel, 1992); ii) high or low 
levels of cholesterol (Muldoon et al., 1997); iii) pancreatic diseases (e.g., diabetes - Ryan, 
2001); and iv) various cancers (Berg, 1988). Most of the mechanisms through which these 
conditions affect cognition are physiological, ranging from reduced cerebral blood flow (due to 
cardiovascular diseases) or reductions in hippocampal volume (due to obesity). 
Importantly, there is independent evidence on the negative association between BMI 
and cognition that comes directly from the SHARE data used in this study (Ziegler and 
Doblhammer, 2010; Memel et al., 2016). 
15 
 
These results are confirmed in our sample as well, as BMI is negatively correlated with 
all our four measures of cognition. As discussed, this is not proving the validity of our MIV 
because these correlations refer to the observed outcomes 𝑦 not the potential ones 𝑦 𝑑 . 
However, they do suggest that our MIV assumptions are not unreasonable.  
The SHARE data are multiply imputed using five different imputed datasets, and thus 
we use the results in Rubin (1987) to combine results from the five datasets and compute the 
point estimates of the bounds and standard errors. To conduct inferences on 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  and the 
ATE we compute (using 1,000 bootstrap replications) two different kinds of confidence 
intervals (CIs): i) for results not using MIV, we compute Imbens-Manski (2004) CIs; while ii) 
for results using MIV, we compute bootstrap percentile CIs  as in de Haan (2011) because 
Imbens-Manski CIs, while very similar to the bootstrap ones, are invalid when using MIVs 
(Manski and Pepper, 2009). Both kinds of CIs cover 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  and the ATE with 95 percent and 
90 percent probability. To account for multiple imputation, we pool the five bootstrapped 
datasets (Schomaker and Heumann, 2018). Finally, since MTR+MTS+MIV bounds involve 
optimizations, the bootstrapped bounds estimates can be biased. We thus apply the bias 
correction procedure suggested by Kreider and Pepper (2007) (see also Manski and Pepper, 
2009). As de Haan (2011) notes, however, the estimate of the bias can be volatile, and thus we 
show results both with and without the bias correction. 
There are many reasons that make PI methods preferable to OLS, IV or paned data 
estimation (see Appendix A.5). PI methods are nonparametric, they estimate the ATE allowing 
for its unlimited heterogeneity in the population, and they rely on plausible assumptions while 
making the identifying power of each one completely transparent.  On the other hand, PI can 
sometimes lead to wide identification regions and so, lack of strong conclusions. However, the 
point estimates obtained via standard estimation methods may give one a false confidence about 
results, as the reduction in uncertainty is obtained through non-testable assumptions that might 
16 
 
not hold in the data. This trade-off between point identification obtained via strong assumptions 
and PI obtained via mild assumptions shows up very clearly in our results below.  
Moreover, while it is easier to find MIVs compared to XIVs, there is no guarantee that 
identification regions that use MIVs will be narrower than those who don’t. In any case, as 
discussed in Appendix A.4 and similarly to XIVs, any valid MIV will generate a valid 
identification region for 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 , although not necessarily the narrowest possible one. 
 
4.  Empirical Results 
We begin by presenting our results for the ATEs of being socially active on respondents’ 
cognitive scores, as obtained from the whole sample.  Table 2 shows the related estimates that 
capture a change in social participation from no activities to two or more activities. For every 
estimation method, we show the estimated lower and upper bounds on the ATE (or, for ETS, 
the point estimate), as well as the 95 percent and 90 percent CIs of the ATE.  
The first method assumes ETS, that is, social participation is completely exogenous to 
cognition. In practice, these estimates are equal to those obtained by running a weighted OLS 
regression on a constant and two dummy variables denoting one and two or more social 
activities. The ETS results show that being socially active has a strong positive effect on 
cognition, with point estimates amounting to 0.67-0.84 SDs for all four cognitive scores when 
engaging in two or more activities compared to none. In addition, the 95 percent CIs around the 
ETS estimates are very narrow, implying that little uncertainty affects these estimates. 
As already mentioned, however, the ETS estimates are likely to be upwardly biased due 
to various unobservables that are positively correlated with both social participation and 
cognition. We thus address the endogeneity of social participation with the PI methods 
discussed in Section 3, starting with the NA method that produces, as expected, the widest 
identification regions by making no assumptions other than the existence of finite extrema. We 
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obtain lower NA bounds of the ATE that are well below zero, and upper NA bounds are well 
above; thus, the identification ranges are uninformative about the ATEs.  
Adding the MTS assumption leads to ATE lower bounds that are somewhat larger than 
under NA, but still well below zero. On the other hand, upper bounds are considerably smaller 
compared to the NA ones. Using the MTR assumption on its own implies that the lower bounds 
of the ATE cannot be smaller than zero, while the upper bounds when compared to NA do not 
change at all. Finally, using the MIV assumption on its own results in lower (upper) bounds that 
are somewhat larger (smaller) than the NA ones, but identification regions remain 
uninformative. 
Combining the MTS and MTR assumptions leaves the lower bounds equal to zero and 
makes the upper bounds considerably smaller than the NA ones. The ATE upper bound derived 
assuming a change from zero to two or more activities equals the corresponding ATE under 
ETS (i.e., the difference in observed mean outcomes – see González, 2005). This value is thus 
likely overestimating the true ATE as it is derived under the very strong assumption of social 
participation exogeneity. Moreover, the 95 percent CIs of the ATEs under MTR+MTS lie 
between zero and values slightly above the upper bounds; hence, the ATEs’ uncertainty under 
MTR+MTS is considerably higher than that under ETS.  
When combining the MTS and MIV assumptions (using BMI as a MIV), the 
identification regions become somewhat narrower compared to those obtained under only MTS, 
but the ATE lower bounds remain well below zero. On the other hand, combining the MTR 
with the MIV assumptions yields ATE lower bounds larger than zero that are statistically 
significant (as showed by the lower bounds of the 95 percent or the 90 percent CIs) when one 
goes from zero to two or more activities. For this particular treatment change, the ATE lower 
bounds without a bias correction are equal to 0.031 words (numeracy), 0.189 words (fluency), 
0.051 words (immediate recall), and 0.062 words (delayed recall). Hence, the MIV assumption 
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clearly leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of no effect only when combined with the 
MTR assumption. Correspondingly, the MTR assumption is necessary but not sufficient for the 
rejection of the null, as the ATE lower bound that it produces when used on its own is zero.  
To get a better idea of the magnitude of the MTR+MIV results for lower bounds we can 
express them in terms of the SDs of the associated test scores. We find that, with bias correction, 
when one goes from zero to two or more activities the ATE lower bounds equal 0.028 SDs for 
numeracy, 0.025 SDs for fluency, 0.028 SDs for immediate recall, and 0.029 SDs for delayed 
recall. While modest, these lower bounds still indicate that social activity has a meaningful 
positive impact on cognition. Upper bounds remain uninformative.  
Finally, when using MIV together with the MTR and MTS assumptions lower bounds 
do not change compared to MTR+MIV, while upper bounds become considerably smaller than 
the MTR+MIV ones. Specifically, these bounds are equal to 0.727 words (0.65 SDs), 6.013 
words (0.80 SDs), 1.265 words (0.69 SDs), and 1.44 words (0.68 SDs) respectively, and are all 
quite lower than both the ETS point estimates and their 95 percent CI lower bounds. Hence, 
ETS leads to inflated estimates of the cognitive effect of social engagement, while PI estimates, 
though smaller, still provide strong evidence of the positive causal impact of social activities 
on cognition.  
The overall result patterns are unchanged when not applying the bias correction. Lower 
bounds are somewhat larger and equal to about 0.035 SDs, while upper bounds are slightly 
smaller and about 0.61 to 0.78 SDs. 
Additionally, we note that the ATEs corresponding to going from zero to one activity 
are also bounded away from zero when using MTR+MTS+MIV, save for fluency (results are 
shown in Panel A of Appendix Table A.1). These ATE lower bounds are, however, not 
statistically significant. As expected, both the lower and the upper bounds of the ATEs are 
smaller than those derived when the number of social activities increases from zero to two or 
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more. On the other hand, when activities change from one to two or more, the ATE 
identification regions (shown in Panel B of Appendix Table A.1) always contain zero. This 
result could be due to the nonlinear relation between social activities and cognition (Appendix 
Fig. A.1), with the marginal cognitive impact of an extra activity falling with the number of 
activities. However, the increased uncertainty associated with PI estimation may also cause this 
pattern of results.  
We also illustrate how much weaker the MIV assumption is compared to the XIV one 
by computing results using the latter (see Appendix Table A.2; we provide in Appendix A.4 
details on how the XIV assumption operates in PI). We note that in almost all cases ATE lower 
bounds become much larger while upper bounds much smaller. Hence, the ATE becomes 
considerably stronger, and the uncertainty about it is significantly reduced. Given that the 
exogeneity of BMI is highly unlikely (as discussed in Section 3), this is an example of 
implausible assumptions producing misleading results. 
 
5.  Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of our results we perform various tests. Due to space 
constraints, we show our results in the Appendix. 
We first examine whether there are differences in PI results in regions across Europe. 
To do so, we group the 20 countries in our sample in two groups, namely i) Northern and Middle 
Europe, consisting of Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, 
Switzerland, Austria, Ireland and Luxembourg; and ii) Southern and Eastern Europe, consisting 
of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, and 
Croatia. We show results based on this sample split in Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4 and note 
that they are very similar to the whole sample ones. Specifically, lower bounds of the ATEs are 
strictly positive under MTR+MTS+MIV for both country groups and for all four cognitive 
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measures when the number of social activities changes from zero to two or more, with 
magnitudes similar to those from the whole sample. We also find a consistently statistically 
significant lower bound for numeracy in Southern and Eastern Europe when the number of 
activities changes from zero to one. 
  We then derive PI regions separately for SHARE waves 1-2 and waves 4-6 to check 
whether our results are affected by the change in the definition of the reference period in which 
social activities are undertaken, as discussed in Section 2. Our results are in Appendix Tables 
A.5 - A.6, with the only notable difference between the two groups of results coming from the 
small and generally statistically insignificant numeracy lower bounds in waves 1-2. 
  Finally, we compute PI regions using only observations without imputed values, which 
leads to samples that are lower by about 3,500 to 4,500 observations, depending on the score. 
Results are shown in Appendix Table A.7 and they are clearly very similar to those from our 
mainline sample that includes imputed values. This is to be expected, given the small, relatively 
to our sample size, number of missing values.  
 
6.  Summary 
This study provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first empirically robust causal 
estimates of the positive effects of social activities on cognition later in life. Using survey data 
on individuals aged 50+ from 20 European countries, we address the issue of social participation 
endogeneity by means of nonparametric partial identification methods that use plausible 
assumptions. The assumption we use that has the highest identifying power is MTR, which 
states that social activities do not harm cognition on average and can also leave it unchanged. 
The use of MTR can be justified both through formal statistical testing and by the 
preponderance of evidence found in the related literature.  
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We first find that social engagement has a positive impact on all cognitive dimensions 
we analyze (numeracy, fluency, immediate and delayed recall). At their upper bound these 
effects are quite large, but smaller than those obtained by assuming away the endogeneity of 
social activities. Naturally, the lower bounds of the ATE identification regions are also smaller 
but still indicate that social engagement has a meaningful positive impact on cognition. Second, 
we show that ignoring the endogeneity of social activities severely underestimates the 
uncertainty about their causal effect on cognition. Finally, our results hold true regardless of 
respondents’ geographic region.  
From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that promoting active ageing should be 
a priority. For instance, access to transport and to technologies supporting self-sufficiency and 
independent life, opportunities for social, cultural and leisure activities, as well as educational 
courses targeted to older individuals, could be subsidized. Similarly, policies targeting the 
reduction of the employment gap between older women and men could be implemented to 
provide equal chances to longer and better working life (e.g., increasing delayed retirement 
provisions, flexible hours, part-time work). Finally, insurance companies could implement 
schemes that reward those who engage in activities that enhance cognitive fitness, and public 
campaigns could raise awareness about the benefits of active ageing. Such interventions may 
provide older individuals with higher quality of life and be cost-effective by keeping them in 
better health, mental and physical, deeper into their lives.  
One interesting future work direction relates to the cognitive impact of the timing and 
duration of social participation along one’s life course. For instance, it could be worthwhile to 
examine whether the positive impact of social activities on cognition extends to ages younger 
than 50. Or whether being socially active in older age reflects long-life behavioural patterns or 
lifestyle changes that occurred rather late in life. Such findings would provide policymakers 
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with valuable information on the mechanisms that could potentially change the dynamics of 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Notes: All figures denote weighted averages, except for the number of observations.  
Variable Austria Germany Sweden Netherlands Spain Italy France
Number of correctly answered numeracy questions (max=4) 2.72 2.63 2.67 2.71 1.62 2.00 2.24
Number of words in fluency test 22.43 21.31 23.09 20.44 15.30 14.95 18.97
Number of words recalled immediately (max=10) 5.59 5.49 5.38 5.38 4.19 4.56 5.04
Number of words recalled with a delay (max=10) 4.28 4.07 4.26 4.11 2.81 3.05 3.75
Number of social activities engaged in 0.53 0.59 0.77 0.82 0.22 0.25 0.58
No participation in any social activity 0.61 0.57 0.44 0.42 0.82 0.79 0.57
Participation in one social activity 0.26 0.28 0.34 0.34 0.14 0.17 0.27
Participation in two or more social activities 0.14 0.16 0.22 0.24 0.04 0.04 0.16
Number of observations 14,872 16,701 15,760 12,096 19,489 18,324 19,076
Denmark Greece Switzerland Belgium Czech Rep. Poland Ireland
Number of correctly answered numeracy questions (max=4) 2.61 2.39 2.80 2.40 2.58 2.04 2.40
Number of words in fluency test 23.06 13.73 21.06 20.52 22.51 16.55 15.66
Number of words recalled immediately (max=10) 5.64 4.86 5.66 5.27 5.48 4.52 5.21
Number of words recalled with a delay (max=10) 4.45 3.34 4.47 3.88 3.95 2.91 4.06
Number of social activities engaged in 0.89 0.19 0.78 0.67 0.39 0.13 0.53
No participation in any social activity 0.37 0.84 0.45 0.52 0.69 0.89 0.60
Participation in one social activity 0.37 0.13 0.32 0.29 0.24 0.08 0.27
Participation in two or more social activities 0.26 0.03 0.23 0.19 0.08 0.03 0.13
Number of observations 13,746 10,385 11,650 22,451 17,785 5,787 975
Luxembourg Hungary Portugal Slovenia Estonia Croatia Total
Number of correctly answered numeracy questions (max=4) 2.45 2.33 1.83 2.23 2.37 2.27 2.29
Number of words in fluency test 18.37 17.31 14.37 21.78 21.62 18.61 18.59
Number of words recalled immediately (max=10) 5.42 5.08 4.30 5.02 5.34 5.17 5.00
Number of words recalled with a delay (max=10) 4.40 3.59 3.07 3.36 3.92 3.49 3.60
Number of social activities engaged in 0.70 0.24 0.26 0.50 0.39 0.20 0.46
No participation in any social activity 0.52 0.81 0.80 0.61 0.71 0.84 0.66
Participation in one social activity 0.27 0.13 0.14 0.28 0.19 0.12 0.23
Participation in two or more social activities 0.21 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.04 0.12
Number of observations 3,019 2,924 3,369 9,537 17,323 2,375 237,644
30 
 
Table 2. Average treatment effect of social activities on cognitive test scores,  

















































Exogenous treatment selection 0.711 0.778 0.718 0.773 6.192 6.542 6.218 6.509 1.268 1.350 1.275 1.343 1.480 1.581 1.489 1.576
No assumptions -2.423 2.442 -2.438 2.456 -2.435 2.454 -21.813 26.110 -21.907 26.196 -21.893 26.181 -5.805 6.483 -5.828 6.506 -5.825 6.503 -4.996 7.292 -5.028 7.314 -5.024 7.310
MTS -2.423 0.747 -2.438 0.778 -2.435 0.773 -21.813 6.366 -21.907 6.542 -21.893 6.509 -5.805 1.309 -5.828 1.350 -5.825 1.343 -4.996 1.531 -5.028 1.581 -5.024 1.576
MTR 0.000 2.442 0.000 2.456 0.000 2.454 0.000 26.110 0.000 26.196 0.000 26.181 0.000 6.483 0.000 6.506 0.000 6.503 0.000 7.292 0.000 7.314 0.000 7.310
MIV (bias corr.) -2.397 2.380 -2.424 2.413 -2.418 2.406 -21.633 24.523 -21.822 24.826 -21.781 24.759 -5.745 6.095 -5.795 6.174 -5.784 6.157 -4.929 7.017 -4.988 7.091 -4.975 7.074
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.747 0.000 0.778 0.000 0.773 0.000 6.366 0.000 6.542 0.000 6.509 0.000 1.309 0.000 1.350 0.000 1.343 0.000 1.531 0.000 1.581 0.000 1.576
MTS + MIV (bias corr.) -2.397 0.727 -2.424 0.795 -2.418 0.780 -21.633 6.013 -21.822 6.272 -21.781 6.215 -5.745 1.265 -5.795 1.317 -5.784 1.305 -4.929 1.441 -4.988 1.515 -4.975 1.498
MTR + MIV (bias corr.) 0.031 2.380 0.001 2.413 0.007 2.406 0.189 24.523 0.047 24.826 0.078 24.759 0.051 6.095 0.014 6.174 0.023 6.157 0.062 7.017 0.022 7.091 0.031 7.074
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.031 0.727 0.001 0.795 0.007 0.780 0.189 6.013 0.047 6.272 0.078 6.215 0.051 1.265 0.014 1.317 0.023 1.305 0.062 1.441 0.022 1.515 0.031 1.498
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.042 0.679 0.012 0.746 0.019 0.731 0.249 5.876 0.109 6.133 0.140 6.077 0.066 1.227 0.030 1.279 0.038 1.267 0.077 1.400 0.039 1.474 0.047 1.458
Number of observations 124,381 231,407 231,407 231,407
0.747 6.366 1.309 1.531










Appendix (to be posted on the journal web site only) 
This Appendix presents the results related to the bounds calculations originally 
discussed in Manski (1990, 1997) and Manski and Pepper (2000).  
 
A.1 No Assumptions (NA) Bounds 
As in Manski (1990), one can replace the counterfactual term 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑   in 





𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑 𝑌 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑  
𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  
𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑 𝑌 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑  
(A.1)
The bounds in (A.1) are obtained without imposing any assumptions on the data, 
other than the existence of finite 𝑌  and 𝑌  The NA bounds can be readily calculated 
using their sample analogues, as these are observed in the data. As Manski (1989) points 
out, taking sample averages leads to consistent estimates of 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 , 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑  and 
𝑃 𝑤 𝑑 .   
 
A.2 Monotone Treatment Response (MTR) 
The NA identification region for the ATE is typically very wide, and always 
includes zero. Hence, one must make additional assumptions to narrow it. The first such 
assumption is that of monotone treatment response (see Manski, 1997). The MTR 
assumption states that for all sample units 𝑖, and for any two treatment values 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 and 
𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 such that 𝑑 𝑑 , 
 
 
𝑦 𝑑 𝑦 𝑑  (A.2)
In our context, the MTR assumption implies that being socially active has a 
weakly increasing effect on cognition for all individuals in the sample. Importantly, (A.2) 
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holds irrespective of the treatment in fact received. Given that at each point in time one 
observes only one outcome for every individual in the sample, one cannot test for the 
validity of (A.2) in isolation using the data at hand.  As already discussed in the 
Introduction, however, there are various reasons - also supported by considerable 
evidence - why one would expect social activity to have a positive effect on cognition.  
In practice, we use a weaker, and thus more conservative, version of the MTR 
assumption than the one in (A.2), which states that for any treatment value 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, and 
any two values 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 and 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 such that 𝑑 𝑑 , 
 
 
𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑  (A.3)
Equation (A.3) implies that social activities have a weakly positive effect on 
cognition on average, but not necessarily for every individual in the sample. Furthermore, 
this average weak monotonicity holds for all subsamples that are defined by the treatment 
in fact received. (Given that (A.3) holds for all values 𝑑 of the observed treatment 𝑤, it is clearly 
the case that the weak monotonicity in (A.3) applies also to the unconditional expectation, hence 
(A.3) implies 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 . However, the converse need not be true.) Clearly, (A.2) 
implies (A.3), but the converse is not necessarily true. As discussed below, we test the 
joint validity of (A.3) and of another hypothesis, and we are unable to refute this joint 
hypothesis.  
As Manski (1997) shows, the MTR assumption (A.2) implies that the bounds on 





𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑 𝑌 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑  
𝐸 𝑦 𝑑
𝑌 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑  
(A.4)
However, it is easy to see that one can obtain (A.4) also under the weaker 
assumption (A.3) instead of (A.2), using the same reasoning as in Manski (1997). 
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Specifically, note that (A.3) implies that 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑  𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑 . Hence, 
𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑  can be used in (A.1) as a lower bound for the counterfactual term 
𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑  instead of 𝑌 , and this leads to the lower bound of (A.4). In an 
analogous fashion, (A.3) implies that 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑  𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑 . Hence, 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤
𝑑  can be used in (A.1) as an upper bound for the counterfactual term 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑  
instead of 𝑌 , which leads to the upper bound of (A.4). 
Importantly, Manski (1997) shows that the identification region of the ATE under 
MTR has a lower bound equal to zero. This is to be expected, as the MTR assumption in 
(A.2) or (A.3) rule out the possibility that a higher value of the treatment induces a lower 
mean outcome, while allowing for the possibility of a zero effect. 
 
A.3 Monotone Treatment Selection (MTS) 
One can further narrow down the identification regions of 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  by adding 
another assumption to the MTR one, namely that of MTS as introduced by Manski and 
Pepper (2000, MP henceforth). The MTS assumption states that for any treatment value 
𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, and any two values 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 and 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 such that 𝑑 𝑑 ,   
𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑤 𝑑  (A.5)
One can think about the MTS assumption as a particular form of non-random 
selection into treatment, i.e., a particular form of violation of equation (3). If (3) does not 
hold, then those who choose different levels of the treatment are also systematically 
different with respect to the outcome in general. The MTS assumption pins down the 
direction of this difference, as it states that higher observed treatment levels lead to 
weakly higher potential outcomes on average, for every value of the treatment.  
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One can test the joint validity of the MTR and MTS hypotheses using a result 
from MP (p.1004, footnote 9), namely that these two hypotheses jointly imply that for 
any two treatment values 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 and 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷 such that 𝑑 𝑑 ,  
 
 
𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑  (A.6)
Equation (A.6) states that the MTR and MTS assumptions jointly imply that the 
observed mean outcomes (i.e. the levels of 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  under ETS) are weakly increasing in 
the value of the treatment. This is clearly the case in our context, in which observed mean 
cognition scores increase with the number of activities (see Fig. 1). 
As shown by MP, the MTR+MTS assumption implies that 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  can now be 
bounded as follows: 
 
  
𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑
𝐸 𝑦 𝑑
𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑 𝐸 𝑦|𝑤 𝑑 𝑃 𝑤 𝑑  
(A.7)
The identification region of the ATE under MTR+MTS, while narrower than the MTR 
one, has still a lower bound equal to zero. On the other hand, González (2005) shows that 
the ATE upper bound of a change in the treatment between its minimum to its maximum 
value (i.e., from no activities to two or more activities) is equal to the ATE under ETS 
(i.e., to the difference in mean outcomes between the two treatment levels).  
A.4 Monotone Instrumental Variables (MIVs) 
One can further narrow the identification region of the ATE by using a 
considerably weaker kind of IV than the usual exogenous one, namely the MIV. MIVs 
were introduced by MP, and they satisfy the following requirement for any pair of values 
𝑧 , 𝑧  of 𝑍 such that 𝑧 𝑧 , 
𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑍 𝑧 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑍 𝑧  (A.8) 
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Equation (A.8) states that the MIV can influence the outcome in a particular 
direction, but also allows for the possibility of no influence whatsoever. Hence, this 
requirement is much weaker than that of an exogenous instrument which requires no 
direct relationship between the instrument and the outcome. It is important to note that 
(A.8) captures only a positive association of 𝑍 with 𝑌; a causal relationship is neither 
implied nor required. 
To better understand how MIVs operate, we first note that we can always express 
the lower bound on 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  under a set of assumptions M as 
𝐿𝐵 𝑑 𝐿𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧 𝑃 𝑍 𝑧  (A.9) 
Clearly, 𝑃 𝑍 𝑧  is given by the data and thus cannot be changed. Hence, to 
increase the overall lower bound 𝐿𝐵 𝑑  one needs to increase the conditional lower 
bounds 𝐿𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧 . Similar arguments hold for the upper bound 𝑈𝐵 𝑑 . 
Let us first examine how an exogenous IV (XIV) – the IV type typically used in 
treatment effect estimation - can help narrow the identification range. Following Manski 
(1990), a variable 𝑍 is a XIV if ∀ 𝑑 ∈ 𝐷, ∀ 𝑧 ∈ 𝑍, 
  𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 | 𝑍 𝑧 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑   (A.10)
Equation (A.10) implies that conditioning on any value of the XIV does not 
change the mean potential outcome. Hence, all identification regions conditional on 
values of Z should provide identical lower and upper bounds on 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 . Therefore, the 
identification region of 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  is the intersection of all identification regions conditional 
on Z. This intersection is contained between the maximum of all conditional lower bounds 
and the minimum of all conditional upper bounds. Hence, we have  
max 𝐿𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 min 𝑈𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧   (A.11)
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 Using XIVs implies that one searches for the maximum lower bound and the 
minimum upper bound on 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  by partitioning the sample in cells defined by the XIV 
values and then comparing the extrema calculated in each cell. This search for the extrema 
is analogous to the search for extrema of objective functions in a dynamic program, or of 
likelihood functions in econometric estimation, which occurs in subsets of the parameter 
space defined by the chosen grid and/or the optimization method. Clearly, different XIVs 
will define different partitions of the sample space, and thus likely yield different extrema.  
There are, however, a couple of key difference between searching for extrema in 
sample space versus parameter space partitions: i) the size of the sample partitions is in 
practice constrained by the number of observations in each cell, whereas there is no such 
constraint when partitioning the parameter space; and ii) local extrema of the bounds on 
𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  define perfectly valid identification regions, similarly to less informative bounds 
computed using weaker assumptions. In other words, using different valid XIVs and 
various possible combinations of their values will always produce valid identification 
regions, albeit not necessarily the most informative ones. On the contrary, local extrema 
of objective functions in a dynamic program or of likelihood functions will typically yield 
estimates that are inconsistent and thus potentially misleading. Hence, PI optimization 
delivers considerably more robust results than dynamic programming or likelihood 
optimization. 
When using an MIV, equation (A.11) does not hold because (A.8) implies that the 
MIV is weakly monotonically correlated with the outcome. As a result, one cannot 
calculate the overall identification region as the intersection of all conditional 
identification regions, as was the case with XIVs. On the other hand, it is possible to 
exploit the fact that, by (A.8), a lower bound on 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 | 𝑍 𝑧  is also a lower bound 
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on 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 | 𝑍 𝑧  for 𝑧 𝑧 , and, correspondingly, an upper bound on 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 | 𝑍 𝑧  
is also a upper bound on 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 | 𝑍 𝑧  for 𝑧 𝑧 . Hence, one can potentially increase 
the lower bound 𝐿𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧  in (A.9) by taking the maximum lower bound 
𝐿𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧  over all 𝑧 𝑧. Correspondingly, one can potentially decrease the upper 
bound 𝑈𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧  by taking the minimum upper bound 𝑈𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧  over all 
𝑧 𝑧. Hence, we obtain 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐿𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑍 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑈𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧  (A.12)
Once the bounds in (A.12) have been computed for all 𝑧, one can take their 





𝑃 𝑍 𝑧 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐿𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧  
𝑃 𝑍 𝑧 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑍 𝑧 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  
𝑃 𝑍 𝑧 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑈𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧  
(A.13)
Hence, by integrating 𝑍 out of the conditional expectation 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 |𝑍 𝑧 , one 
can obtain bounds on 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 . Clearly, the optimization operations in (A.12) take place 
over a restricted range of values of Z compared to (A.11), and thus the identifying power 
of the MIV assumption is smaller than that of the XIV one. This is to be expected, as the 
weak monotonicity of a MIV in (A.8) is a weaker assumption than the exogeneity of an 
XIV in (A.10). As is the case with XIVs, this weak monotonicity assumption is imposed 
on the unobserved potential outcome 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 ; hence, it cannot be tested using the 
observed data without imposing further assumptions.  
We note that when using MIVs one partitions the sample space to look for extrema 
of the bounds conditional on each MIV value, that is, of 𝐿𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧  and 
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𝑈𝐵 𝑑|𝑍 𝑧 . Once these conditional extrema have been computed, they can be used 
to calculate the unconditional bounds on 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑  by integrating out the conditioning MIV 
as in (A.13). As is the case with XIVs, all valid MIVs will generate valid identification 
regions, although not necessarily the most informative ones. 
In our context, the MIV used (i.e., BMI), is assumed to have a weakly negative 
effect on cognition. To adhere to the positive weak positive monotonicity in (A.8) we 
redefine it by using 15-tiles of its values in reverse order.  
 
A.5 Advantages of PI  
All in all, there are many reasons why one would prefer PI methods to other more 
commonly used ones (e.g. OLS-, IV- or panel data-based) when trying to estimate the 
causal effect of interest. First, PI methods are completely nonparametric, as they require 
only the calculation of sample averages of the outcome and the prevalence of the 
treatment.  
Second, PI methods produce estimates of the ATE across all sample units, and not 
of the LATE as is the case with IV estimation when the treatment is heterogeneous. Thus, 
they allow for arbitrary forms of heterogeneity of the treatment effect because the ATE 
is just an average magnitude across sample units. Such unlimited heterogeneity of the 
treatment effect is not typically allowed for, as in most estimation methods one makes 
specific assumptions about how the treatment variable enters the specification. Moreover, 
if one is interested in the heterogeneity of the treatment effect in specific dimensions, then 
one can simply apply PI methods to subsamples defined by particular combinations of 
values of control variables.  
Third, in PI one bounds the unconditional expectation 𝐸 𝑦 𝑑 , taking as given 
the distribution of all observables and unobservables (other than the treatment) that might 
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affect the outcome. Hence, one does not need to worry about i) which variables to add in 
the empirical specification; ii) the manner in which they appear; and iii) whether they are 
endogenous.  
Fourth, PI methods accommodate any form of endogeneity (e.g., due to both time-
varying and time-invariant unobservables or selectivity), as they allow for any form of 
non-random selection into treatment. This also implies that one does not need to assume 
specific properties of the error term, as is the case with regression methods. 
 Fifth, PI uses very few and quite mild assumptions to narrow the identification 
region of the estimates, and some of them can be tested (e.g. MTR+MTS). Importantly, 
it is completely transparent about how adding each assumption affects the identification 
region. In contrast, most commonly used estimation methods impose simultaneously 
many assumptions on the empirical model, and thus it is typically unclear how each of 
them affects estimates.  
Sixth, PI methods allow the use MIVs that can tighten the identification regions. 
As is the case with standard IV estimation, the assumptions behind those variables cannot 
be tested without making further assumptions. However, MIVs - unusable in standard IV 
estimation - are required to be weakly monotonically related to the outcome, which is a 
much weaker assumption than the exogeneity required of standard IVs.  
Seventh, PI uses the data as a cross-section, and so panel data are not required. 
One can accommodate dependencies among sample units (e.g. due to repeated 
observation or features of the sampling process) through the appropriate clustering and 
stratification when bootstrapping standard errors. 
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Exogenous treatment selection 0.465 0.519 0.469 0.515 3.729 4.018 3.763 3.999 0.814 0.881 0.819 0.875 0.926 1.007 0.932 1.000
No assumptions -2.134 2.249 -2.147 2.261 -2.145 2.259 -19.778 23.780 -19.860 23.857 -19.847 23.845 -5.243 5.925 -5.265 5.947 -5.262 5.943 -4.596 6.572 -4.625 6.595 -4.621 6.592
MTS -1.885 0.627 -1.898 0.652 -1.896 0.648 -17.351 6.014 -17.418 6.156 -17.406 6.133 -4.601 1.372 -4.616 1.407 -4.614 1.401 -4.110 1.647 -4.131 1.688 -4.129 1.682
MTR 0.000 2.139 0.000 2.150 0.000 2.149 0.000 21.939 0.000 21.997 0.000 21.987 0.000 5.454 0.000 5.470 0.000 5.466 0.000 5.956 0.000 5.977 0.000 5.974
MIV (bias corr.) -2.102 2.174 -2.130 2.208 -2.124 2.201 -19.557 22.025 -19.743 22.358 -19.702 22.285 -5.176 5.512 -5.227 5.595 -5.216 5.576 -4.521 6.261 -4.579 6.339 -4.566 6.322
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.517 0.000 0.542 0.000 0.538 0.000 4.174 0.000 4.306 0.000 4.286 0.000 0.900 0.000 0.932 0.000 0.929 0.000 1.031 0.000 1.071 0.000 1.065
MTS + MIV (bias corr.) -1.860 0.604 -1.888 0.651 -1.881 0.641 -17.135 5.691 -17.324 5.920 -17.283 5.870 -4.535 1.305 -4.586 1.356 -4.575 1.345 -4.035 1.556 -4.094 1.618 -4.081 1.605
MTR + MIV (bias corr.) 0.000 2.057 0.000 2.092 0.000 2.084 0.000 19.963 0.000 20.318 0.000 20.240 0.000 4.984 0.000 5.072 0.000 5.053 0.000 5.557 0.000 5.646 0.000 5.626
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.006 0.488 0.000 0.538 0.000 0.527 0.000 3.864 0.000 4.092 0.000 4.042 0.004 0.829 0.000 0.874 0.000 0.864 0.002 0.940 0.000 0.995 0.000 0.983
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.017 0.461 0.000 0.510 0.000 0.499 0.000 3.728 0.000 3.954 0.000 3.905 0.016 0.806 0.000 0.851 0.000 0.841 0.013 0.915 0.000 0.969 0.000 0.957
Exogenous treatment selection 0.212 0.291 0.219 0.284 2.303 2.678 2.329 2.652 0.415 0.506 0.423 0.498 0.508 0.617 0.518 0.610
No assumptions -3.424 3.329 -3.435 3.341 -3.433 3.339 -32.112 32.408 -32.216 32.501 -32.202 32.486 -8.274 8.270 -8.301 8.295 -8.296 8.291 -8.112 8.432 -8.139 8.456 -8.136 8.452
MTS -2.459 2.041 -2.480 2.074 -2.476 2.067 -20.183 16.074 -20.280 16.266 -20.268 16.237 -5.329 4.061 -5.355 4.106 -5.350 4.099 -4.292 3.290 -4.324 3.339 -4.318 3.332
MTR 0.000 1.881 0.000 1.894 0.000 1.892 0.000 21.358 0.000 21.425 0.000 21.415 0.000 5.225 0.000 5.242 0.000 5.239 0.000 6.339 0.000 6.360 0.000 6.357
MIV (bias corr.) -3.392 3.302 -3.418 3.325 -3.412 3.320 -31.689 32.111 -31.893 32.253 -31.848 32.222 -8.183 8.198 -8.229 8.236 -8.219 8.228 -7.999 8.346 -8.053 8.390 -8.041 8.380
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.593 0.000 0.624 0.000 0.619 0.000 5.024 0.000 5.199 0.000 5.167 0.000 1.016 0.000 1.055 0.000 1.050 0.000 1.197 0.000 1.244 0.000 1.238
MTS + MIV (bias corr.) -2.439 2.024 -2.483 2.092 -2.474 2.077 -19.997 15.821 -20.193 16.064 -20.150 16.011 -5.300 4.050 -5.345 4.102 -5.335 4.090 -4.242 3.234 -4.295 3.304 -4.283 3.289
MTR + MIV (bias corr.) 0.000 1.855 0.000 1.881 0.000 1.875 0.000 20.811 0.000 21.042 0.000 20.991 0.000 5.129 0.000 5.174 0.000 5.164 0.000 6.240 0.000 6.290 0.000 6.279
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.000 0.573 0.000 0.642 0.000 0.627 0.000 4.737 0.000 4.973 0.000 4.921 0.000 0.996 0.000 1.044 0.000 1.034 0.000 1.132 0.000 1.202 0.000 1.187
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.000 0.530 0.000 0.597 0.000 0.582 0.000 4.609 0.000 4.844 0.000 4.792 0.000 0.959 0.000 1.007 0.000 0.996 0.000 1.091 0.000 1.161 0.000 1.146
Number of observations
Assumptions
Numeracy                                  Fluency                                    Immediate recall Delayed recall 
124,381 231,407 231,407 231,407
0.254 2.482 0.462 0.566
Panel B. ATE of a change from one activitiy to two or more activities
Panel A. ATE of a change from no activities to one activity
0.493 3.884 0.846 0.965
 
Note: MTR: monotone treatment response, MTS: monotone treatment selection, MIV: monontone instrumental valuabe (reversed 15-tiles of body mass index). 
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Table A.2. Average treatment effect of social activities on cognitive test scores, whole sample, 

















































XIV (bias corr.) -1.800 2.170 -1.859 2.208 -1.846 2.200 -17.215 22.016 -17.630 22.351 -17.539 22.277 -4.549 5.511 -4.658 5.594 -4.634 5.576 -3.805 6.261 -3.926 6.340 -3.899 6.322
MTS + XIV (bias corr.) -1.504 0.482 -1.568 0.542 -1.554 0.529 -14.277 5.037 -14.737 5.386 -14.636 5.309 -3.767 1.052 -3.888 1.134 -3.861 1.116 -3.195 1.217 -3.325 1.318 -3.297 1.295
MTR + XIV (bias corr.) 0.000 2.053 0.000 2.092 0.000 2.083 0.000 19.945 0.000 20.305 0.000 20.226 0.000 4.981 0.000 5.070 0.000 5.050 0.000 5.552 0.000 5.642 0.000 5.622
MTR + MTS + XIV (bias corr.) 0.208 0.405 0.163 0.465 0.173 0.451 0.854 3.415 0.610 3.728 0.664 3.659 0.275 0.601 0.207 0.683 0.222 0.665 0.316 0.671 0.242 0.763 0.258 0.743
MTR + MTS + XIV (no bias corr.) 0.210 0.364 0.166 0.421 0.176 0.408 0.955 3.175 0.719 3.473 0.771 3.408 0.304 0.571 0.241 0.651 0.255 0.633 0.353 0.641 0.282 0.731 0.297 0.711
XIV (bias corr.) -2.181 2.373 -2.228 2.411 -2.218 2.403 -19.781 24.498 -20.152 24.807 -20.070 24.739 -5.263 6.089 -5.356 6.170 -5.336 6.152 -4.352 7.014 -4.462 7.092 -4.438 7.075
MTS + XIV (bias corr.) -2.181 0.572 -2.228 0.661 -2.218 0.641 -19.781 5.305 -20.152 5.753 -20.070 5.654 -5.263 1.045 -5.356 1.148 -5.336 1.125 -4.352 1.212 -4.462 1.329 -4.438 1.303
MTR + XIV (bias corr.) 0.246 2.373 0.199 2.411 0.210 2.403 1.174 24.498 0.937 24.807 0.989 24.739 0.326 6.089 0.261 6.170 0.276 6.152 0.379 7.014 0.304 7.092 0.321 7.075
MTR + MTS + XIV (bias corr.) 0.234 0.586 0.189 0.676 0.199 0.656 1.174 5.305 0.937 5.753 0.989 5.654 0.326 1.045 0.261 1.148 0.276 1.125 0.379 1.212 0.304 1.329 0.321 1.303
MTR + MTS + XIV (no bias corr.) 0.236 0.551 0.193 0.634 0.202 0.616 1.271 5.116 1.041 5.554 1.092 5.458 0.355 0.986 0.295 1.087 0.308 1.064 0.413 1.148 0.343 1.262 0.358 1.237
XIV (bias corr.) -3.351 3.173 -3.383 3.220 -3.376 3.210 -31.248 31.165 -31.511 31.454 -31.453 31.390 -8.071 7.935 -8.136 8.015 -8.122 7.998 -7.909 8.116 -7.974 8.192 -7.959 8.175
MTS + XIV (bias corr.) -2.340 1.752 -2.393 1.848 -2.381 1.827 -19.124 13.888 -19.455 14.410 -19.382 14.295 -5.031 3.527 -5.108 3.651 -5.091 3.624 -3.922 2.760 -4.012 2.885 -3.992 2.858
MTR + XIV (bias corr.) 0.000 1.808 0.000 1.844 0.000 1.836 0.000 20.823 0.000 21.038 0.000 20.991 0.000 5.091 0.000 5.149 0.000 5.136 0.000 6.133 0.000 6.202 0.000 6.187
MTR + MTS + XIV (bias corr.) 0.000 0.378 0.000 0.465 0.000 0.445 0.000 3.672 0.000 4.117 0.000 4.019 0.000 0.720 0.000 0.819 0.000 0.797 0.000 0.809 0.000 0.925 0.000 0.899
MTR + MTS + XIV (no bias corr.) 0.000 0.341 0.000 0.423 0.000 0.405 0.000 3.527 0.000 3.961 0.000 3.866 0.000 0.658 0.000 0.755 0.000 0.734 0.000 0.737 0.000 0.850 0.000 0.825
Number of observations
Panel A. ATE of a change from no activities to one activity
Panel B. ATE of a change from no activities to two or more activities
Assumptions
Numeracy                                  Fluency                                    Immediate recall Delayed recall 
124,381 231,407 231,407 231,407
Panel B. ATE of a change from one activity to two or more activities





















































Exogenous treatment selection 0.318 0.382 0.323 0.377 2.513 2.870 2.548 2.842 0.548 0.630 0.556 0.625 0.648 0.754 0.660 0.745
No assumptions -2.299 2.269 -2.316 2.287 -2.314 2.284 -21.988 23.768 -22.106 23.888 -22.089 23.873 -5.699 6.033 -5.729 6.063 -5.725 6.059 -5.308 6.424 -5.343 6.453 -5.338 6.450
MTR 0.000 2.113 0.000 2.130 0.000 2.127 0.000 21.108 0.000 21.202 0.000 21.184 0.000 5.341 0.000 5.361 0.000 5.358 0.000 5.523 0.000 5.549 0.000 5.546
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.378 0.000 0.408 0.000 0.404 0.000 3.026 0.000 3.194 0.000 3.163 0.000 0.661 0.000 0.699 0.000 0.692 0.000 0.790 0.000 0.837 0.000 0.829
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.016 0.345 0.000 0.391 0.000 0.381 0.007 2.778 0.000 3.023 0.000 2.969 0.034 0.582 0.000 0.646 0.000 0.632 0.009 0.708 0.000 0.782 0.000 0.765
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.033 0.310 0.000 0.355 0.003 0.345 0.087 2.596 0.000 2.840 0.000 2.786 0.054 0.541 0.000 0.604 0.010 0.590 0.037 0.656 0.000 0.729 0.000 0.713
Exogenous treatment selection 0.516 0.590 0.522 0.585 4.419 4.857 4.450 4.801 0.950 1.043 0.957 1.034 1.142 1.261 1.151 1.250
No assumptions -2.619 2.466 -2.637 2.485 -2.634 2.482 -24.111 26.053 -24.234 26.176 -24.213 26.159 -6.262 6.601 -6.292 6.633 -6.287 6.627 -5.708 7.155 -5.744 7.184 -5.738 7.181
MTR 0.000 2.466 0.000 2.485 0.000 2.482 0.000 26.053 0.000 26.176 0.000 26.159 0.000 6.601 0.000 6.633 0.000 6.627 0.000 7.155 0.000 7.184 0.000 7.181
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.552 0.000 0.590 0.000 0.585 0.000 4.614 0.000 4.857 0.000 4.801 0.000 0.995 0.000 1.043 0.000 1.034 0.000 1.202 0.000 1.261 0.000 1.250
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.048 0.508 0.009 0.564 0.018 0.552 0.307 4.429 0.065 4.711 0.118 4.649 0.102 0.947 0.045 1.014 0.058 0.999 0.099 1.127 0.039 1.219 0.053 1.198
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.062 0.462 0.025 0.518 0.033 0.505 0.398 4.200 0.159 4.481 0.211 4.419 0.120 0.892 0.063 0.959 0.076 0.944 0.121 1.060 0.061 1.151 0.074 1.131
Exogenous treatment selection 0.164 0.242 0.171 0.234 1.721 2.127 1.761 2.103 0.356 0.449 0.363 0.442 0.439 0.561 0.448 0.552
No assumptions -3.234 3.111 -3.250 3.128 -3.248 3.125 -29.959 30.122 -30.103 30.268 -30.080 30.246 -7.700 7.705 -7.737 7.743 -7.731 7.737 -7.537 7.868 -7.576 7.904 -7.570 7.897
MTR 0.000 1.734 0.000 1.750 0.000 1.748 0.000 19.834 0.000 19.923 0.000 19.910 0.000 4.998 0.000 5.020 0.000 5.016 0.000 5.924 0.000 5.950 0.000 5.945
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.407 0.000 0.444 0.000 0.437 0.000 3.376 0.000 3.582 0.000 3.550 0.000 0.723 0.000 0.764 0.000 0.758 0.000 0.879 0.000 0.934 0.000 0.924
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.000 0.375 0.000 0.429 0.000 0.418 0.000 3.215 0.000 3.476 0.000 3.419 0.000 0.707 0.000 0.765 0.000 0.752 0.000 0.813 0.000 0.898 0.000 0.879
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.000 0.332 0.000 0.386 0.000 0.374 0.000 3.026 0.000 3.284 0.000 3.227 0.000 0.657 0.000 0.715 0.000 0.702 0.000 0.760 0.000 0.845 0.000 0.826
Number of observations 66,981 126,289 126,289 126,289
Panel B. ATE of a change from no activities to two or more activities
0.552 4.614 0.995 1.202
Panel C. ATE of a change from one activity to two or more activities
0.202 1.921 0.404 0.499
Panel A. ATE of a change from no activities to one activity
0.350 2.693 0.591 0.703
Assumptions
Numeracy                                  Fluency                                    Immediate recall Delayed recall 
 
Note: See note to Table A.1. Northern and Middle Europe includes Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Switzerland, Austria, Ireland and 
Luxembourg   
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Exogenous treatment selection 0.423 0.523 0.433 0.514 3.160 3.610 3.204 3.580 0.848 0.978 0.857 0.966 0.903 1.048 0.914 1.039
No assumptions -1.918 2.222 -1.938 2.242 -1.935 2.238 -16.798 23.795 -16.920 23.891 -16.896 23.874 -4.629 5.780 -4.659 5.807 -4.654 5.802 -3.637 6.772 -3.676 6.804 -3.669 6.798
MTR 0.000 2.173 0.000 2.191 0.000 2.188 0.000 23.060 0.000 23.155 0.000 23.143 0.000 5.605 0.000 5.631 0.000 5.627 0.000 6.540 0.000 6.575 0.000 6.569
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.481 0.000 0.530 0.000 0.521 0.000 3.493 0.000 3.722 0.000 3.690 0.000 0.933 0.000 0.994 0.000 0.985 0.000 0.995 0.000 1.067 0.000 1.058
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.061 0.362 0.000 0.524 0.009 0.489 0.128 3.085 0.000 3.543 0.000 3.442 0.039 0.845 0.000 0.924 0.000 0.906 0.040 0.911 0.000 1.001 0.000 0.981
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.078 0.314 0.014 0.473 0.028 0.437 0.266 2.806 0.041 3.257 0.091 3.157 0.067 0.795 0.014 0.874 0.025 0.857 0.068 0.855 0.007 0.945 0.021 0.925
Exogenous treatment selection 0.628 0.795 0.640 0.780 5.652 6.487 5.734 6.428 1.297 1.504 1.314 1.489 1.368 1.616 1.388 1.603
No assumptions -2.166 2.411 -2.188 2.431 -2.184 2.427 -18.714 26.187 -18.862 26.293 -18.836 26.278 -5.188 6.325 -5.225 6.355 -5.220 6.351 -4.037 7.476 -4.082 7.507 -4.075 7.501
MTR 0.000 2.411 0.000 2.431 0.000 2.427 0.000 26.187 0.000 26.293 0.000 26.278 0.000 6.325 0.000 6.355 0.000 6.351 0.000 7.476 0.000 7.507 0.000 7.501
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.713 0.000 0.795 0.000 0.780 0.000 6.056 0.000 6.487 0.000 6.428 0.000 1.399 0.000 1.504 0.000 1.489 0.000 1.488 0.000 1.616 0.000 1.603
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.069 0.720 0.002 0.979 0.017 0.922 0.218 5.654 0.000 6.282 0.044 6.144 0.057 1.259 0.004 1.424 0.016 1.388 0.055 1.276 0.000 1.503 0.009 1.453
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.086 0.552 0.022 0.793 0.036 0.740 0.355 5.193 0.135 5.816 0.183 5.679 0.084 1.172 0.032 1.336 0.043 1.300 0.084 1.191 0.025 1.411 0.038 1.362
Exogenous treatment selection 0.153 0.338 0.166 0.322 2.250 3.108 2.312 3.045 0.379 0.603 0.399 0.582 0.390 0.656 0.412 0.634
No assumptions -3.671 3.612 -3.686 3.627 -3.683 3.625 -35.015 35.491 -35.140 35.600 -35.122 35.583 -9.047 9.032 -9.075 9.063 -9.071 9.058 -8.887 9.191 -8.920 9.220 -8.916 9.215
MTR 0.000 2.072 0.000 2.092 0.000 2.089 0.000 23.413 0.000 23.509 0.000 23.493 0.000 5.531 0.000 5.559 0.000 5.554 0.000 6.900 0.000 6.932 0.000 6.929
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.628 0.000 0.712 0.000 0.697 0.000 5.406 0.000 5.823 0.000 5.769 0.000 1.224 0.000 1.330 0.000 1.312 0.000 1.300 0.000 1.426 0.000 1.408
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.000 0.629 0.000 0.882 0.000 0.827 0.000 4.962 0.000 5.594 0.000 5.455 0.000 1.095 0.000 1.258 0.000 1.222 0.000 1.099 0.000 1.325 0.000 1.275
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.000 0.466 0.000 0.692 0.000 0.642 0.000 4.524 0.000 5.149 0.000 5.011 0.000 1.010 0.000 1.172 0.000 1.136 0.000 1.017 0.000 1.235 0.000 1.187
Number of observations 57,400 105,118 105,118 105,118
Panel B. ATE of a change from no activities to two or more activities
0.713 6.056 1.399 1.488
Panel C. ATE of a change from one activity to two or more activities
0.241 2.672 0.485 0.513
Panel A. ATE of a change from no activities to one activity
0.472 3.384 0.914 0.974
Assumptions
Numeracy                                  Fluency                                    Immediate recall Delayed recall 
 
Note: See note to Table A.1. Southern and Eastern Europe includes Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, and Croatia. 
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Exogenous treatment selection 0.481 0.550 0.486 0.544 3.844 4.266 3.880 4.233 0.744 0.853 0.753 0.845 0.695 0.820 0.705 0.809
No assumptions -2.101 2.197 -2.117 2.212 -2.115 2.210 -18.663 23.237 -18.772 23.344 -18.754 23.328 -4.938 5.806 -4.967 5.833 -4.962 5.829 -4.172 6.572 -4.207 6.605 -4.202 6.598
MTR 0.000 2.113 0.000 2.128 0.000 2.125 0.000 22.066 0.000 22.158 0.000 22.145 0.000 5.491 0.000 5.514 0.000 5.510 0.000 6.146 0.000 6.179 0.000 6.175
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.535 0.000 0.566 0.000 0.561 0.000 4.232 0.000 4.448 0.000 4.419 0.000 0.833 0.000 0.888 0.000 0.879 0.000 0.794 0.000 0.854 0.000 0.845
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.000 0.521 0.000 0.561 0.000 0.552 0.055 3.976 0.000 4.281 0.000 4.214 0.071 0.698 0.005 0.804 0.019 0.781 0.028 0.729 0.000 0.815 0.000 0.796
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.005 0.484 0.000 0.524 0.000 0.515 0.160 3.741 0.000 4.046 0.001 3.979 0.096 0.656 0.030 0.761 0.044 0.738 0.053 0.668 0.000 0.754 0.011 0.735
Exogenous treatment selection 0.721 0.812 0.728 0.806 6.244 6.859 6.304 6.803 1.204 1.362 1.217 1.348 1.179 1.366 1.191 1.349
No assumptions -2.411 2.388 -2.427 2.405 -2.425 2.402 -21.074 25.714 -21.206 25.829 -21.190 25.809 -5.563 6.434 -5.597 6.466 -5.592 6.461 -4.605 7.392 -4.647 7.420 -4.641 7.416
MTR 0.000 2.388 0.000 2.405 0.000 2.402 0.000 25.714 0.000 25.829 0.000 25.809 0.000 6.434 0.000 6.466 0.000 6.461 0.000 7.392 0.000 7.420 0.000 7.416
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.768 0.000 0.812 0.000 0.806 0.000 6.570 0.000 6.859 0.000 6.803 0.000 1.282 0.000 1.362 0.000 1.348 0.000 1.272 0.000 1.366 0.000 1.349
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.007 0.744 0.000 0.813 0.000 0.797 0.223 6.054 0.027 6.576 0.070 6.461 0.107 1.233 0.040 1.432 0.055 1.388 0.065 1.207 0.011 1.346 0.023 1.316
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.024 0.689 0.000 0.756 0.003 0.742 0.325 5.798 0.129 6.316 0.172 6.202 0.130 1.108 0.064 1.305 0.079 1.261 0.090 1.104 0.036 1.242 0.048 1.211
Exogenous treatment selection 0.202 0.299 0.208 0.292 2.188 2.846 2.243 2.805 0.396 0.562 0.408 0.552 0.411 0.619 0.430 0.600
No assumptions -3.511 3.393 -3.524 3.407 -3.522 3.405 -33.622 33.689 -33.748 33.814 -33.728 33.795 -8.628 8.631 -8.659 8.663 -8.654 8.658 -8.436 8.823 -8.472 8.850 -8.466 8.846
MTR 0.000 1.865 0.000 1.879 0.000 1.877 0.000 21.574 0.000 21.666 0.000 21.650 0.000 5.381 0.000 5.404 0.000 5.401 0.000 6.641 0.000 6.667 0.000 6.663
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.626 0.000 0.670 0.000 0.662 0.000 5.462 0.000 5.752 0.000 5.696 0.000 1.064 0.000 1.140 0.000 1.126 0.000 1.064 0.000 1.152 0.000 1.137
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.000 0.605 0.000 0.673 0.000 0.658 0.000 4.950 0.000 5.467 0.000 5.353 0.000 1.033 0.000 1.231 0.000 1.187 0.000 1.011 0.000 1.149 0.000 1.118
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.000 0.554 0.000 0.620 0.000 0.606 0.000 4.711 0.000 5.225 0.000 5.112 0.000 0.910 0.000 1.105 0.000 1.062 0.000 0.913 0.000 1.050 0.000 1.020
Number of observations 57,509 57,509 57,509 57,509
Panel B. ATE of a change from no activities to two or more activities
0.768 6.570 1.282 1.272
Panel C. ATE of a change from one activity to two or more activities
0.252 2.526 0.486 0.516
Panel A. ATE of a change from no activities to one activity
0.516 4.045 0.797 0.756
Assumptions
Numeracy                                  Fluency                                    Immediate recall Delayed recall 
 
Note: See note to Table A.1.
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Exogenous treatment selection 0.415 0.500 0.424 0.494 3.603 3.954 3.636 3.923 0.790 0.873 0.799 0.867 0.975 1.077 0.982 1.067
No assumptions -2.196 2.346 -2.218 2.367 -2.215 2.364 -20.427 24.095 -20.531 24.193 -20.515 24.175 -5.421 5.995 -5.447 6.022 -5.443 6.017 -4.844 6.572 -4.876 6.602 -4.871 6.596
MTR 0.000 2.188 0.000 2.206 0.000 2.204 0.000 21.865 0.000 21.944 0.000 21.931 0.000 5.432 0.000 5.451 0.000 5.448 0.000 5.845 0.000 5.871 0.000 5.866
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.495 0.000 0.533 0.000 0.528 0.000 4.114 0.000 4.294 0.000 4.261 0.000 0.891 0.000 0.928 0.000 0.924 0.000 1.095 0.000 1.146 0.000 1.137
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.038 0.383 0.000 0.502 0.000 0.476 0.000 3.714 0.000 4.017 0.000 3.951 0.000 0.812 0.000 0.867 0.000 0.855 0.008 0.985 0.000 1.058 0.000 1.042
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.067 0.340 0.000 0.458 0.009 0.432 0.000 3.549 0.000 3.846 0.000 3.781 0.007 0.780 0.000 0.835 0.000 0.823 0.029 0.945 0.000 1.018 0.000 1.002
Exogenous treatment selection 0.681 0.775 0.689 0.767 6.018 6.424 6.049 6.398 1.204 1.297 1.210 1.289 1.474 1.594 1.482 1.585
No assumptions -2.445 2.543 -2.468 2.566 -2.464 2.562 -22.242 26.340 -22.363 26.433 -22.344 26.418 -5.946 6.511 -5.975 6.539 -5.971 6.534 -5.224 7.233 -5.262 7.260 -5.255 7.256
MTR 0.000 2.543 0.000 2.566 0.000 2.562 0.000 26.340 0.000 26.433 0.000 26.418 0.000 6.511 0.000 6.539 0.000 6.534 0.000 7.233 0.000 7.260 0.000 7.256
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.727 0.000 0.775 0.000 0.767 0.000 6.228 0.000 6.424 0.000 6.398 0.000 1.249 0.000 1.297 0.000 1.289 0.000 1.537 0.000 1.594 0.000 1.585
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.080 0.663 0.004 0.799 0.021 0.769 0.144 5.837 0.000 6.172 0.016 6.098 0.037 1.200 0.000 1.263 0.006 1.249 0.075 1.428 0.026 1.521 0.037 1.501
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.106 0.587 0.032 0.720 0.048 0.691 0.246 5.621 0.081 5.951 0.118 5.878 0.058 1.151 0.019 1.213 0.028 1.199 0.095 1.373 0.047 1.465 0.057 1.445
Exogenous treatment selection 0.215 0.321 0.225 0.313 2.247 2.678 2.284 2.645 0.369 0.469 0.376 0.458 0.452 0.577 0.463 0.567
No assumptions -3.262 3.209 -3.280 3.228 -3.277 3.226 -31.233 31.662 -31.349 31.769 -31.332 31.753 -8.067 8.059 -8.096 8.089 -8.092 8.084 -7.923 8.204 -7.954 8.231 -7.950 8.226
MTR 0.000 1.910 0.000 1.929 0.000 1.926 0.000 21.233 0.000 21.313 0.000 21.298 0.000 5.134 0.000 5.153 0.000 5.150 0.000 6.164 0.000 6.189 0.000 6.185
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.551 0.000 0.596 0.000 0.588 0.000 4.770 0.000 4.959 0.000 4.925 0.000 0.927 0.000 0.971 0.000 0.964 0.000 1.141 0.000 1.196 0.000 1.189
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.000 0.494 0.000 0.624 0.000 0.596 0.000 4.463 0.000 4.755 0.000 4.690 0.000 0.910 0.000 0.965 0.000 0.953 0.000 1.042 0.000 1.128 0.000 1.109
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.000 0.424 0.000 0.553 0.000 0.525 0.000 4.282 0.000 4.572 0.000 4.508 0.000 0.863 0.000 0.918 0.000 0.906 0.000 0.996 0.000 1.082 0.000 1.063
Number of observations 66,872 173,898 173,898 173,898
Panel B. ATE of a change from no activities to two or more activities
0.727 6.228 1.249 1.537
Panel C. ATE of a change from one activity to two or more activities
0.268 2.463 0.418 0.514
Panel A. ATE of a change from no activities to one activity
0.459 3.765 0.832 1.023
Assumptions
Numeracy                                  Fluency                                    Immediate recall Delayed recall 
 
Note: See note to Table A.1.
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Exogenous treatment selection 0.454 0.506 0.460 0.503 3.724 4.002 3.744 3.976 0.801 0.871 0.807 0.865 0.914 0.994 0.922 0.988
No assumptions -2.146 2.246 -2.159 2.259 -2.156 2.257 -19.825 23.778 -19.907 23.854 -19.890 23.837 -5.255 5.924 -5.276 5.943 -5.271 5.941 -4.621 6.563 -4.650 6.585 -4.646 6.581
MTR 0.000 2.134 0.000 2.146 0.000 2.143 0.000 21.921 0.000 21.980 0.000 21.974 0.000 5.448 0.000 5.464 0.000 5.461 0.000 5.940 0.000 5.961 0.000 5.957
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.508 0.000 0.529 0.000 0.526 0.000 4.154 0.000 4.291 0.000 4.262 0.000 0.893 0.000 0.925 0.000 0.919 0.000 1.021 0.000 1.058 0.000 1.053
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.006 0.478 0.000 0.526 0.000 0.515 0.000 3.805 0.000 4.032 0.000 3.982 0.001 0.817 0.000 0.860 0.000 0.851 0.000 0.926 0.000 0.976 0.000 0.965
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.017 0.450 0.000 0.498 0.000 0.488 0.000 3.685 0.000 3.913 0.000 3.863 0.016 0.796 0.000 0.839 0.000 0.829 0.011 0.902 0.000 0.951 0.000 0.940
Exogenous treatment selection 0.701 0.767 0.706 0.761 6.166 6.528 6.190 6.499 1.259 1.341 1.264 1.334 1.471 1.573 1.480 1.567
No assumptions -2.437 2.440 -2.451 2.453 -2.449 2.451 -21.867 26.118 -21.958 26.206 -21.947 26.191 -5.819 6.484 -5.844 6.507 -5.840 6.503 -5.022 7.287 -5.052 7.310 -5.047 7.305
MTR 0.000 2.440 0.000 2.453 0.000 2.451 0.000 26.118 0.000 26.206 0.000 26.191 0.000 6.484 0.000 6.507 0.000 6.503 0.000 7.287 0.000 7.310 0.000 7.305
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.733 0.000 0.767 0.000 0.761 0.000 6.344 0.000 6.528 0.000 6.499 0.000 1.300 0.000 1.341 0.000 1.334 0.000 1.521 0.000 1.573 0.000 1.567
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.031 0.715 0.002 0.783 0.009 0.768 0.195 5.984 0.055 6.241 0.086 6.184 0.050 1.254 0.018 1.304 0.025 1.293 0.062 1.426 0.025 1.498 0.033 1.482
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.042 0.666 0.013 0.733 0.020 0.719 0.253 5.848 0.113 6.105 0.144 6.049 0.065 1.219 0.033 1.269 0.040 1.258 0.077 1.388 0.040 1.460 0.049 1.444
Exogenous treatment selection 0.213 0.286 0.219 0.281 2.293 2.680 2.325 2.651 0.420 0.507 0.425 0.499 0.508 0.619 0.519 0.610
No assumptions -3.414 3.317 -3.425 3.329 -3.423 3.327 -32.057 32.355 -32.160 32.449 -32.144 32.434 -8.260 8.256 -8.284 8.279 -8.279 8.275 -8.093 8.414 -8.120 8.439 -8.116 8.435
MTR 0.000 1.869 0.000 1.882 0.000 1.880 0.000 21.331 0.000 21.403 0.000 21.391 0.000 5.217 0.000 5.233 0.000 5.230 0.000 6.325 0.000 6.345 0.000 6.342
MTR + MTS 0.000 0.580 0.000 0.614 0.000 0.608 0.000 4.999 0.000 5.184 0.000 5.152 0.000 1.008 0.000 1.045 0.000 1.039 0.000 1.187 0.000 1.241 0.000 1.231
MTR + MTS + MIV (bias corr.) 0.000 0.562 0.000 0.629 0.000 0.614 0.000 4.729 0.000 4.964 0.000 4.912 0.000 0.989 0.000 1.036 0.000 1.026 0.000 1.119 0.000 1.188 0.000 1.173
MTR + MTS + MIV (no bias corr.) 0.000 0.517 0.000 0.584 0.000 0.569 0.000 4.597 0.000 4.831 0.000 4.780 0.000 0.952 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.989 0.000 1.080 0.000 1.148 0.000 1.133
Number of observations 120,384 227,898 227,786 226,871
1.300 1.521
Panel C. ATE of a change from one activity to two or more activities
0.250 2.483 0.462 0.566
Assumptions
Numeracy                                  Fluency                                    Immediate recall Delayed recall 
Panel B. ATE of a change from no activities to two or more activities
0.733 6.344
Panel A. ATE of a change from no activities to one activity
0.483 3.861 0.838 0.954
 
Note: See note to Table A.1.
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Notes: The height of the histogram bars corresponds to the weighted average of the cognition score within the group of individuals who exhibit a given 
level of social activities. The vertical lines in the middle of the bars denote 95 percent confidence intervals. 
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